Moral cognition · Neuroscience

Research

A decade studying how people judge harm, forgive accidents, and help strangers, alongside software for reproducible research.

Press

“We May Have Been Wrong About Autism And Empathy”
— HuffPost, on our study of moral decision-making in autism

Press coverage includes Time, HuffPost, and Vice. See Publications for the full bibliography.

Three lines of enquiry

Research Lines

Moral Judgement About Harm: Emotion, Reasoning, and Their Interplay

When avoiding harm conflicts with maximising welfare, emotional harm aversion and reasoned cost-benefit analysis compete. My research examines what tips the balance.

Key findings

  • Across eight independent studies, reasoning ability predicts utilitarian choices independently of aversion to causing harm[1]
  • Psychopathy's link to utilitarian judgement reflects reduced aversion to performing harmful acts, not its accompanying reduction in concern for victims[3]
  • People who reject sacrificing one to save many in written dilemmas nevertheless do so in emotionally arousing virtual reality[4]
  • Reasoning ability predicts leniency for accidental harm, but not intentional or attempted harm[2]
Dual-process theoryMoral dilemmasfMRIVirtual realityBehavioural experiments
Relevant Publications (4)

Find PDFs, supplementary materials, and data on the Publications page.

Empathy, Prosociality, and the Neural Basis of Moral Emotion

Empathic concern for victims shapes blame and helping, with distinct neural signatures for each.

Key findings

  • The pain-empathy network encodes outcome severity and drives blame, but contributes differently to acceptability judgements[3]
  • Grey matter volume in the left anterior STS, a theory-of-mind region, predicts willingness to forgive accidents; the previously emphasised temporo-parietal junction does not[4]
  • Costly personal sacrifices to rescue others in a virtual emergency are associated with a larger right anterior insula, a region central to empathic motivation[2]
  • Across 24 studies (21,000+ participants), compensating victims earned more reputational benefit than punishing perpetrators by signalling genuine prosocial character[1]
fMRINeuroimagingProsocialityAltruismThird-party punishmentEmpathy
Relevant Publications (4)

Find PDFs, supplementary materials, and data on the Publications page.

Individual Differences: Personality, Psychopathology, and Moral Judgement

Moral judgements vary with stable differences in emotional and cognitive processing.

Key findings

  • Alexithymia (difficulty identifying one's emotions) reduces empathic concern and increases acceptance of harmful acts, especially unintentional ones[5][6]
  • In autistic adults, autistic traits increase harm aversion while co-occurring alexithymia reduces empathic concern; opposing effects can mask differences in group averages[3]
  • People with multiple sclerosis judge others' violations more harshly than controls, explained by elevated cognitive alexithymia rather than disease-specific neurological changes[2]
  • People with anxiety disorders show intact moral judgement and report no heightened emotion during dilemmas, suggesting clinical arousal differs from the emotion shaping moral judgement[1]
AlexithymiaPsychopathyAutismMultiple sclerosisAnxietyIndividual differences
Relevant Publications (6)

Find PDFs, supplementary materials, and data on the Publications page.

Open tools

Research Software

The tools I built to answer my own research questions soon outgrew them.

My open-source R and Python packages support statistical visualisation, analysis, and reporting, alongside developer tools for reliable research code. They are used across fields, from ecology to clinical trials.

Explore the open-source work

Route · Trieste to Cambridge to Berlin

Research Positions

2017 – 2019

Cambridge, MA, USA

Postdoctoral Researcher

Harvard University

Department of Psychology

Advisor: Mina Cikara and Fiery Cushman