Moral Judgment About Harm: Emotion, Reasoning, and Their Interplay
When facing dilemmas that pit not causing harm against maximising welfare, two systems pull in different directions: emotion-driven harm aversion, and reasoning-based cost-benefit analysis. A decade of research mapped how each operates, when they conflict, and what tips the balance.
- Reasoning ability predicts utilitarian choices across eight independent studies – independently of how intensely someone dislikes causing harm
- Psychopathy's link to utilitarian judgement is driven specifically by reduced aversion to performing harmful acts – not by its reduced concern for victims, which is also present but does not account for the effect
- People who judge sacrificing one to save many as wrong in text nonetheless carry it out in emotionally arousing virtual reality – behaviour and stated principles can dissociate
- Better reasoners judge accidental harms more leniently – an effect specific to accidents, absent for intentional or attempted harm
Relevant Publications (4)
- Patil, I.* , Zucchelli, M.M.*, Kool, W., Campbell, S., Fornasier, F., Calò, M., Silani, G., Cikara, M., & Cushman, F.A.. (2021). Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 120(2), 443–460.
- Patil, I., & Tremolière, B.. (2021). Reasoning supports forgiving accidental harms. Scientific Reports, 11:14418.
- Patil, I.. (2015). Trait psychopathy and utilitarian moral judgment: The mediating role of action aversion. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 27(3), 349–366.
- Patil, I., Cogoni, C., Zangrando, N., Chittaro, L., & Silani, G.. (2014). Affective basis of judgment-behavior discrepancy in virtual experiences of moral dilemmas. Social Neuroscience, 9(1), 94–107.
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